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1. Introduction
Πολεμοσ παντων μεν πατηρ εστι, παντων δε βασιλευσ.
War is the father of all things, the king of everything.
  Heraclitus
Nulla salus bello.
No good is in war.
  Vergilius
The two quotes of the sages of antiquity have according to modern scientiﬁc un-
derstanding turned out to be more relevant than their authors probably suspected. 
On the one hand it is now widely agreed that the phenomenal development of the 
Western Civilization which is presently spreading over the whole world, has been 
caused by systems competition of many or several states, including military and 
foreign policy competition often culminating in wars.
As already Immanuel Kant emphasised:
Now the States are already in the present day involved in such close relations 
with each other that none of them can pause or slacken in its internal civilisation 
without losing power and inﬂuence in relation to the rest ... Civil liberty cannot now 
be easily assailed without inﬂicting such damage as will be felt in all trades and 
industries, and especially in commerce; and this would entail a diminution of the 
powers of the State in external relations ... And thus it is that, notwithstanding the 
intrusion of many a delusion and caprice, the spirit of enlightenment gradually arises 
as a great good which the human race must derive even from the selﬁsh purposes 
of aggrandisement on the part of its rulers, if they understand what is for their own 
advantage (1784/1959: 31).
On the other hand, because of this development military preparations and wars 
are consuming ever increasing resources and the latter are leading to rising losses 
of life and destruction of property.
Subsequently I will ﬁrst sketch the theory why military and foreign policy com-
petition have been beneﬁcial for economic development and the rise of the rule 
of law and democracy. Next I want to discuss several characteristics concerning 
the international game of power and point out their importance for the growth of 
government. After that some empirical evidence will be presented. Finally some 
conclusions will be offered.
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2. From Foreign Policy and Military Competition 
to Institutional and Market Competition
The analysis given by Kant provides some clues to answer the question:
Under which conditions can a prosperous and free society come into existence? 
Why should the ruling elite in an autocracy agree to strong and secure property 
rights, to minimal state intervention, to a strong limitation of taxes, and thus of its 
own powers to command and to take away goods at their own discretion? It seems 
that the ‘New Economic Historians’ and other scholars have tried with a certain 
success to answer these questions (Baechler, North and Thomas 1973; North 1981; 
Jones 1981). They have stressed that ‘European disunity has been our good luck’. 
Feudalism with its many power centers developed during the Middle Ages and a 
split opened up between religious and temporal powers. A ﬁerce rivalry arose among 
the many European rulers to extend and preserve their powers by foreign policy 
and military endeavours. This forced them to become interested in the well-being 
and loyalty of their subjects and in economic development to secure a greater tax 
base and thus stronger armies. However, economic development itself depended 
on establishing adequate property rights, a reliable legal system, free markets and 
limited taxes. As a consequence, those states were successful in this foreign policy 
and military competition in the long run who, by chance or by design, made the 
greatest progress in introducing such institutions. Thus competition among states 
forced on unwilling rulers a limitation of domestic powers. The development of 
competing legal systems, of the rule of law and of property rights was helped not 
only by interstate competition but also by the increasing separation of church and 
state, the preventing of a theocracy (Berman 1984). Because of these developments 
limited government and a pluralistic society arose in Europe as a pre-democratic 
achievement. First capitalism and later democracy were their progeny.
I have argued elsewhere (Bernholz 1995) that international competition among 
states is a driving force even until today, motivating rulers like in Japan in the Meiji 
Era, or Gorbatchew and Deng to limit their domestic powers with the purpose to 
strengthen their economies as a base of international power. Whether the reforms 
are adequate and thus successful is, of course, another question.
 Consequences of Military and Foreign Policy Competition for Economic Development and the Growth ofBig Government 5
Imitation by other  
countries
Ideologies and other  
factors, inhibiting or 
supporting reforms
Foreign policy  
and military 
competition among  
several rulers  
(nations)
Safe property and  
contract 
rights, moderate taxes 
and density of 
regulations
Institutional 
reforms,  
institutional 
competition
Military and 
foreign  
policy 
superiority
Higher  
revenues of 
government, 
stronger military 
forces 
Economic  
competition:  
innovations,  
higher efﬁciency and 
economic growth
People in  
other countries 
make comparisons; 
„Brain Drain“, rela-
tive or absolute  
poverty
Inﬂow of  
capital and of 
highly qualiﬁed 
people
 
Higher  
living standard, 
longer lives, 
better  
education
Figure 2.1
Systems Competition
Foreign Policy 
Competition
Institutional
Competition 
Market
Competition
Ideological
Competition
6 Consequences of Military and Foreign Policy Competition for Economic Development and the Growth ofBig Government.
It follows from the above that military and foreign policy competition among 
many or several states has led as a consequence to institutional competition for 
ever better institutional settings. Within such favourable frameworks market com-
petition leading to greater efﬁciency, innovation and economic growth could de-
velop (Figure 2.1). As a bye-product of institutional and market competition rule 
of law and democratic societies were established.
But in democracies there are political forces working towards the erosion of 
the rules and institutions on which their success is founded. Shifting majorities in 
parliament, i.e., small minorities of the population, only inadequately controlled 
by rationally uninformed voters, can enforce their goals on the rest of the popu-
lation. Since several parties compete for votes and need ﬁnancial support to cover 
the expenses of their organizations and for election campaigns, one has to expect 
in time an ever-increasing sphere of government activities. Thus growing public 
expenditures, more and more regulations by government, tax loopholes and sub-
sidies to special minority interests and pressure groups, ﬂow from the incessant 
activity of legislative bodies. Such developments can happen because the majo-
rity of voters is rationally uninformed about most issues. This is true for all those 
issues concerning which decisions impinge only marginally on the situation of 
consumers or taxpayers, since in these cases they have little reason to incur the 
costs of informing themselves, given the negligible effect of individual votes on 
election outcomes. Thus protection of certain industries against foreign compe-
tition, the ﬁxing of agricultural prices above market clearing levels, subsidies to 
coal or steel industry and the toleration or even promotion of cartels can be ob-
served, though a majority of voters is hurt by higher taxes and/or prices. On the 
other hand, whenever changes like rent increases for housing are perceived by a 
majority of voters, since the expenditures for rents amount to a substantial part 
of their budgets, or if a majority of voters is aware that aredistribution of Incomes 
would beneﬁt them, the government will take action in favour of the majority e.g., 
by introducing rent controls or income transfers (Downs 1957; Bernholz 1966, 
Meltzer and Scott 1983). 
If the above arguments are correct, why is it that government activities are not 
increased at once under the pressure of political competition to a Nash equilibri-
um level in which each party maximizes votes, if such an equilibrium exists? Why 
does it take decades for government activity to rise to ever higher levels? Several 
reasons have been given to explain this empirical fact (for a recent review of the 
extensive literature and an empirical test of an overarching theory see Cusack and 
Fuchs 2002). Olson (1965, 1982) points out that since it is difﬁcult to form interest 
groups because they provide public goods to their members, it takes time to orga-
nize them (see also Bernholz 1969). The more diverse the interests and the greater 
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the number of potential members, the more difﬁcult the task and the longer the 
time needed to organize an interest group. As a consequence, cartels can only be 
formed and inﬂuence be exerted by potential interest groups on the political sys-
tem after they have found enough time to be organized.
Bernholz (1966) has pointed out a second reason for the gradual extension 
of government, namely changes of the industrial structure brought about again 
and again by economic development. These changes threaten old industries, their 
capital owners and managers as well as the jobs and the wage level of the people 
employed by them. This leads to voter dissatisfaction and thus, under the pressu-
re of political competition, to government intervention to maintain or to win the 
support of those voters and of their families who suffer from the changes in the 
industrial structure. A third reason sometimes mentioned in the literature is more 
or less closely related to the second: 
„The need to keep in check the forces which might produce unemployment is 
not the only root of the expansion of government control over industry and trade, 
because the sheer growth of complexity of economic structures requires more co-
ordination, and the number of tasks which cannot be left to private initiative – such 
as prevention of soil erosion, trafﬁc control, smoke abatement and so on – grows 
incessantly“ (Andreski 1965, p. 355). 
Finally, time is obviously needed to invent new governmental measures, to in-
troduce and to pass new legislation, taxes and subsidies.
Let us turn next to the question, whether a free and democratic society with 
the rule of law can be maintained or be re-established after a degenerative deve-
lopment. It is true that there are some institutions like referenda and popular initia-
tives or the inﬂuence of public-minded advisors which are retarding the inexorable 
growth of government expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) and interventions 
(Frey/Kirchgässner 1994). But apart from perceived crises (Dur and Swank 1997) 
they seem not to be able to stop the growth of government and the erosion of 
individual rights, as evidenced by empirical developments during the last decades 
(Bernholz 1986, Weede 1986, Tanzi/Schuknecht 1997). 
It follows from the above analysis that there exists an inherent tendency in 
democracies for government to grow. The situation, however, is different in si-
tuations which are perceived by the population and (or) politicians as crises. In 
such cases public-minded statesmen or advisors may have great inﬂuence, if their 
ideas succeed against competing simplifying ideologies. Examples are the success 
of the West German (ordo-)liberals after the catastrophe of the second world war 
(Peacock and Willgerodt 1989); the reforms by Mrs. Thatcher in Britain after it 
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had lagged more and more economically compared to other European countries 
and even been overtaken by Italy; or the drastic reforms ﬁrst taken by the labour 
government in New Zealand after the extended welfare state based on a mainly 
agricultural economy had led the country into a deep unemployment, budget de-
ﬁcit and foreign exchange crisis. 
Moreover, from the argument presented above, it can also be derived that 
a weakening of the relative foreign policy and military position of Great Powers 
caused by a relatively bad economic performance as a consequence of increasing 
government may be perceived as a crisis and lead to reforms in the direction of 
re-establishing more limited government.
3. Is there a Contradiction between the Positive 
Inﬂuence of Military and Foreign Policy Competition 
and the Waste of Resources through them.
The above arguments concerning the beneﬁcial consequences of military and fo-
reign policy competition for institutional and market competition seem to lead to 
a contradiction. For it appears to be obvious that rearmament and warfare are de-
pendent on higher government expenditures and the introduction of military service 
for many people and of other regulations limiting the free decisions of citizens. 
These factors, however, must not only reduce individual freedom but also neces-
sarily decrease efﬁciency, innovative capabilities and civilian economic resources. 
As a consequence economic growth and well-being should be reduced.
Though these obnoxious inﬂuences for economic growth cannot be denied, no 
contradiction is present if certain conditions are fulﬁlled. Namely, the beneﬁcial 
institutional reforms as well as their positive consequences have to take place 
before armament and war expenditures and efforts are substantially increased. 
For then increasing outlays for military purposes can be based on a higher gross 
domestic product so that a lower share of GDP is necessary to cover them than 
in less developed countries whose institutional reforms have been lagging. This 
is especially the case if potential adversaries have been less successful to reform 
and if their economic potential it therefore falling behind. We can thus propose 
the hypothesis that the military expenditures as a share of total government ex-
penditures and even of GDP should decrease in successfully developing nations 
in the long run. And if we look at long-term historical developments this seems 
to be conﬁrmed by the empirical evidence for the former statement (Figure 3.1). 
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Though the same does not necessarily hold for the share of military expenditures 
in GDP, since the share of total expenditures in GDP has substantially risen since 
1960 (Figure 3.2). Cusack and Fuchs (2002) show (pp. 13 f.), that this has in fact 
been the case for the average of 16 OECD countries from 1960 to 1995. And it is 
even conﬁrmed for the USA for the period from 1969 to 1992, in which it became 
the only remaining superpower (Figures 3.3 and 3.4). But it should be understood 
Figure 3.1
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that a decreasing share of military expenditures does not imply that they have 
not increased in absolute terms nor that this share did not rise in cases of actual 
warfare and that this might not have a lasting inﬂuence on the rise of total go-
vernment expenditures as a share of GDP.
Figure 3.3 Share of Military Expenditures in GDP, 1913-2003
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Figure 3.4: US Federal Expenditures as Percentage of GDP
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We have derived a surprising result: The share of government expenditures for 
military purposes in GDP is reduced because of the beneﬁcial results of military 
and foreign policy competition for institutional competition and therefore for eco-
nomic growth. But does this mean that systems competition of this kind has also 
a negative inﬂuence on the share of total government outlays in GDP? This is still 
an open question, which we will try to answer later.
4. Factors Inﬂuencing the Relative Size of Military 
Expenditures of Different Countries
It has been shown that the growth of GDP per capita enables states to decrease 
the share of military expenditures in GDP without endangering their international 
power position. But this position in the international game of power is also inﬂu-
enced by other factors, which have to be considered next.
Let us begin by stating that small and even medium-sized countries cannot 
afford to keep up with the armament efforts of big nations. But what does „small“ 
and „big“ mean in the international system? A ﬁrst approach to answer this ques-
tion can be taken by looking at the factors which have historically determined that 
certain states became great powers. At ﬁrst look it seems obvious that besides 
geographical position the size of territory and population and the state of econo-
Figure 4.1
 The Ten Leading Economic Powers in 1820 and 1998 as Measured by
the Shares of their GDP as % of World Total
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mic and technological development of nations should have been decisive. But it is 
interesting to note that empirically all Great Powers of the last two hundred years 
can be found by looking at only two factors, namely the sizes of GDP and of GDP 
per Capita. Figure 4.1 shows that all Great Powers in 1820 and 1998 belonged to 
the ten countries with the highest GDPs in the world. On the other hand, not all 
countries with the highest GDPs were Great Powers, for instance China and India 
in 1820. The reason for this can be easily understood by looking at GDP per Capita 
in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.1 also makes clear why the USA developed to the only re-
maining Superpower until 1998 and that Austria-Hungary and Prussia were rather 
weak Great Powers in 1820. The ﬁgures also suggest that with further rapid eco-
nomic development China and India and perhaps Brazil are probable to become 
Great Powers within the next decades.
In spite of this result it is not advisable to underestimate the importance of 
the size of territory and population and the geographical position for the status 
of a Great Power. First the ﬁrst two factors were largely responsible for the size of 
GDP before the industrial revolution. Second, the UK and Russia would have been 
Source for Figures 4.1 and 4.2: Maddison (1995, 2001)
Comment: Italy was no nation in 1820, as was Austria-Hungary in 1998. For this year the ﬁgures 
for Austria and Hungary have been added. No GDP per Capita has been available for Prussia for 
1820, so that for Germany has been taken. France was taken as a reference point in Figure 4.2, 
since it was the militarily strongest nation around 1800.
Figure 4.2
 The Ten Leading Powers ind 1820 and 1998 as Compared by Their
GDP per Capita in Relation to France
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conquered by Napoleon and Hitler had they not been an island or so huge, respec-
tively. Similarly, the USA could not have been defeated in 1820 in spite of its rela-
tive economic weakness compared to Britain and France because it was protected 
by two oceans against other Great Powers.
Our analysis implies that economically small countries, as measured by the 
relative size of their GDP, have scarcely a chance to obtain the status of Great Po-
wers. But if this is true we have to expect that they will as a rule spend a smaller 
share of their expenditures for military purposes than the latter. Another factor 
which should inﬂuence this share is the geographical position of countries, sin-
ce countries isolated by seas or which are of a large territorial expansion are less 
threatened by other Great Powers. Similarly, nations at the periphery of internati-
onal systems are in better positions than those located in its center, since they are 
confronted by a smaller number of potential opponents (for historical evidence see 
Bernholz 1985, p.81; Collins 1978, 1986, p.187 f.; 1995, p.1555; Mc Neill 1963; 
Weede 1996, p.130). Finally, it has been shown by Zeckhauser that the strongest 
member in a coalition like the USA in Nato has to bear a relatively heavier burden 
of military expenditures than the other members.
Though careful empirical tests of these hypotheses are still necessary, the ad hoc 
evidence seems to support them. In Figure 4.3 we see that the strongest member 
of NATO, the USA, is distinguished during the period of the cold war by a far higher 
Figure 4.3
Development of Share of Military Expenditures (For Some Cases 1898/99,
Including Expenditures for Colonies) in Total Expenditures, 
1898/99-1928/29
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share of military expenditures then its other members. And the share of military 
expenditures of a small country like Belgium is especially small. Note that Japan 
was a special case, since it has been disarmed after World War II and decided to 
demilitarise „permanently“. To be able to ﬁnd some evidence that countries at the 
periphery and protected by seas or large territories enjoy a lower share of military 
expenditures we have to look at periods without a superpower or two opposing 
alliances like after World War II. An adequate time for this purpose is the period 
before World War I. As can be seen from Figure 4.4, the share of Germany as a 
central power is indeed higher than those of the peripheral Great Powers in the 
years before the war, with the only exception of Britain in 1901/04. The low share 
of military expenditures of Austria-Hungary as a central power seems to contra-
dict the hypothesis, but in this case the far weaker economic base has to be taken 
into account (Figure 4.1). One warning has, however to be expressed. The shares of 
Germany and the USA may be somewhat too high, because only the ﬁgures for the 
federal government have been available. It is perhaps also revealing that in contrast 
to the continental powers the UK and the USA did not know the draft before World 
War I. Finally note also, that Belgium as a small country shows again a small share 
of military in total government expenditures during this period. 
5. Hysteresis Effects of War-related 
Military Expenditures
We have now to turn to the question whether temporary disturbances increasing 
military expenditures like wars, arms races or other dramatic international tensi-
ons may lead to a permanent rise of the share of government expenditures in GDP. 
And this even given the fact that the military expenditures are themselves reduced 
after the international crisis has vanished. More than four decades ago a seminal 
paper by Peacock and Wiseman (1961) stated such a relationship concerning the 
growth of public expenditures in the UK. According to their view, in the absence 
of unusual events, citizens have fairly stable feelings about the tolerable level of 
taxation. But in times of emergencies like wars they are prepared to accept a higher 
level of taxation which before was thought to be intolerable. And when the dis-
turbance has disappeared the acceptance of the higher level remains since voters 
have now adapted to it. Such disturbances thus create a so-called displacement 
effect which shifts public revenues and expenditures to new levels. As a conse-
quence the government can now implement programs which it had thought to be 
desirable before, since military expenditures can be lowered when the crisis has 
vanished (for a short outline see Rowley and Tollison 1994).
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During recent years this hypothesis has been analysed concerning its mea-
ning and been empirically tested by several scholars (Henry and Olekalns 2000, 
Goff 1996, Legrenzi 2001, Lybeck and Henrekson 1989, 1990). The evidence its 
still not conclusive. Lybeck and Henrekson have stated, that the displacement hy-
pothesis has not been falsiﬁed after thirty years of research, whereas Henrekson 
(1990) concluded that the evidence has been refuted for the two world wars for 
Sweden and the UK. On the other hand, Henry and Olekalns demonstrated that 
displacement has occurred in ﬁve cases in the United Kingdom since 1836. Goff 
has pointed to the inﬂuence of interest groups and bureaucracies in maintaining 
the once reached higher level of public expenditures for their own purposes (p. 
144), given rationally uninformed voters, as a reason for this hysteresis effect. He 
demonstrated the presence of this persistence effect for the USA for the period 
1889-1993. But again, Legrenzi did not ﬁnd conﬁrmation for the presence of the 
displacement effect for Italy.
To get some impression of the relationships let us look again at Figure 3.2. 
We ﬁnd a strong increase of the share of government expenditures in GDP from 
1913-1938 because of the two world wars for the six countries considered. And 
this share does not decrease to the level of 1913 in any of them, though the share 
of their military expenditures was strongly reduced as shown before. The share of 
expenditures in 1950 compared to 1938, but not to 1913 only decreased in the 
defeated countries, namely Germany and Japan. This was perhaps contributing to 
their „economic miracle“ after World War II. We observe again a decrease of the 
share of public expenditures from 1992 to 1999 for all countries except for Japan, 
a fact which is probably related to the end of the cold war. But again, no country 
reverted to the level of 1950.
I admit that this is a rather superﬁcial ad hoc analysis, given the many factors 
responsible for the development of public expenditures (Cusack and Fuchs 2002). 
But it strengthens the impression gained from the studies by Henry and Olekalns 
and Goff that the displacement effect of high military expenditures in times of 
crisis may be an important factor for the permanent rise of the share of public 
expenditures in GDP. But, as mentioned, the answer to the question whether the 
displacement effect is in fact working in most cases is still an open issue.
6. Conclusions
In the present paper the relationships between military and foreign policy compe-
tition, the economic development of nations and the consequences for the share 
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of military and total public expenditures in GDP have been discussed. The following 
results were obtained:
1. Military and foreign policy competition of many or several states seem to have 
had favourable long-term inﬂuences in establishing institutional and market 
competition beneﬁcial to economic growth.
2. This economic growth has led to a long-term reduction of the share of military 
expenditures in total public expenditures and in GDP even for Great Powers.
3. The emergence of Great Powers has at least in the last two centuries mainly 
been determined by their economic strength as measured by total GDP and 
by GDP per capita.
4. Other factors inﬂuencing the share of government expenditures are their size, 
their geographical position at the center or the periphery of the international 
system, and the protection offered by barriers like the sea. The share of small 
countries tends to be smaller, like that of countries protected by barriers or at 
the periphery.
5. Though the share of military expenditures decreases strongly after wars or 
severe international tensions, their increase during such periods of crises has 
possibly a long-lasting positive effect on the share of total public expenditures 
in GDP.
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